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INTRODUCTION
IRVING J. GoFFmAN*
The functions of taxation, particularly at the national level of government, have undergone dramatic changes in recent decades. The very title of
this symposium bears testimony to this fact. For while it has always been
proper to regard and analyze taxes in terms of their revenue-yielding capacities, they have rarely been considered appropriate tools for the deliberate
manipulation of social and economic phenomena. Undoubtedly, economists
and politicians were aware of the fact that compulsory levies upon a population would have some impact upon behavior, but this apparently failed to
lead them to the conclusion that the impact ought to be planned in order
to contribute to the attainment of certain social ends. Such a conclusion
could not readily be reached in Western economic thinking until a better
understanding was had of the appropriate fiscal functions of modem marketoriented government.
Contemporary thinking in fiscal economics recognizes several broad problem areas in which the state may properly employ its fiscal instruments of
taxing, spending, and borrowing. These problem areas stem from several
sources: there are major limitations and deficiencies inherent in the private
market mechanism that militate against the optimum use of a nation's scarce
resources; also, even when the "invisible hand" of the market process performs its assigned functions perfectly, it may yield a result that is in conflict
with the values of the society; and finally, the evolved political and social institutions of a nation often necessitate complementary fiscal action. To help
remedy the resulting problems, nations have undertaken responsibilities in
at least three, and possibly four, broad functional areas in which taxes may
be used as effective policy instruments. These are sometimes referred to as
the Allocation Function, the Redistribution Function, the Stabilization and
Growth Function, and, in states organized along federal lines, Fiscal Federalism. The papers that are included in this symposium deal with some of
the issues related to the use of taxation in carrying out one or more of these
functions.
The AllocationFunction of the state concerns the composition of the
national output. For numerous reasons, it will be necessary for governments
to divert resources from the production of market-directed goods and services
to the production of what may be termed public goods. Labor, land, and
*B.A. 1954, McGill University; M.A. 1957, Ph.D. 1959, Duke University; Professor of
Economics, University of Florida.
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capital that might otherwise be employed in the production of, say, more
private automobiles, more household appliances, and more electric toothbrushes are instead used for the production of, say, more missiles and space
capsules, more courtrooms, and more miles of highways. By deliberately
intervening in the resource allocation process, the state causes a change in
the quality (though not necessarily the quantity) of the total output. Such
intervention is essential if resources are to be utilized so that they yield
the greatest individual and social satisfaction. For the fact is that certain
types of goods and services simply cannot be adequately provided via the
private market process.
Though the reasoning behind this conclusion is well known to professional economists, some of the more important factors may be summarized
here. First, there are technical conditions that may prevent the private
sector from optimizing the use of resources. Some products when used optimally are unprofitable. A bridge, for example, exhibits a near-zero marginal
cost for usage, that is, there is virtually no additional cost associated with additional crossings. Its most effective use would therefore be a near-zero price
per crossing, which would hardly render it a profitable private investment.'
Some products provide indivisible benefits to all regardless of whether one
personally pays for the product. A defense system may be cited as one such2
commodity not subject to what economists call the "exclusion principle."
In a similar vein, some products yield primary as well as secondary benefits.
Education yields utility not only to those who are educated, but also to the
society as a whole. But these spillover benefits cannot readily be priced in
the private marketplace. 3
Another set of circumstances, which may call forth allocative activities
on the part of the state, has to do with the conflict between consumer sovereignty and the democratic process. The basic market decision is expressed
through buying power such that those who have this power will determine
the way resources are to be used. But private resource-use decisions may not
always coincide with the moral or aesthetic value system of the group. Thus,
a part of this decision is transferred out of the market and into the political
sphere where majority opinion and not dollar-votes determines the productmix in the system.
For these reasons and some others, there has always been some allocative
function assigned to the state, even among the foremost proponents of free
enterprise economics. 4 But how should these publicly provided goods and

1. We assume that bridge crossings exhibit rapidly declining marginal costs and that
marginal cost pricing prevails.
2. The "exclusion principle" may be defined as the condition whereby a consumer is
excluded from enjoying the benefits of a good or service unless he is willing to pay the

market price.
3.

The discussion of spillovers or "external economies and diseconomies" has been quite
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(1961).
4.

See, e.g., L.

POLITICAL ECONOMY

ROBBINS, THE THEORY

OF

WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SUBSIDY PROGRAMS

ECONOMIC POLICY IN ENGLISH AND

CLASSICAL

(1962).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol20/iss4/1

2

1968]

Goffman: Introduction
INTRODUCTION

services be financed? What type of tax system, if any, should be employed?
An extensive body of literature has developed around this aspect of the allocative function, particularly around the two fundamental principles of tax
burden distribution-benefit taxation and ability-to-pay taxation. It may
be forcefully argued that the nature of the allocation function calls for taxation according to benefits received, recognizing, however, that often such
benefits may be related positively to private income. On the other hand,
maximizing total social utility may require an ability-to-pay tax system, and
perhaps even a highly progressive one at that, but this position is subject
to serious qualification. 5
The second major taxing function of the state, the Redistribution Function, may be defined as the deliberate use of taxing and spending powers so
as to change the distribution of the nation's income from what it would
have been in the absence of any such deliberate activity. This function arises
because of the possible conflict between the distribution of the product among
the citizens by the market process and the distribution that is considered
'just" in some ethical sense. While the allocative function concerns itself
with the kind of pie, the redistributive function is concerned with the size
of the slices. In both cases we assume the size of the total pie to remain
unchanged. This is perhaps the best example of an issue arising from the conflict of two equally noble ends, namely freedom and justice. On the one
hand, economic freedom refers to a system of free enterprise that, when in
ideal operation, leads to distribution on the basis of individual performancemarginal productivity. In other words, a consequence of this particular economic organization is a particular income distribution. This is simply a
truism and is mathematically demonstrable; in no way does it imply that it
is ideal in any ethical sense. But there is an ethical end that is concerned
with distribution based on some belief concerning social justice. Whether it
be based on humanitarianism or egalitarianism, some form of distributive
justice is a goal of our society; and it need not be identified with the distribution based upon personal marginal productivities. Here we have conflicting
values that must be resolved by the state through its redistributive function.
But how? In its simplest form, this activity requires taxing one group
(presumably the rich) and transferring these resources to the other group
(namely the poor). Whether the transfer consists of money or commodities
is another area worthy of debate. But in either case, redistribution requires
that those with higher incomes (or wealth) pay higher taxes. Precisely how
much higher is a political decision based upon the extent of the desired redistribution. It is in this context that progressive taxation can find its
strongest defense and presumably this is the basis for much of the statutory
progression in this country and elsewhere. But the true extent of the politically desired redistribution may better be revealed by the effective rate struc-

5. For a rigorous analysis of both tax principles see R. A. MusGpav, THE THEoRy or
The most extensive critical examination of tax progression theory is W. BLUVi & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGREssIVE TAXATiON (1953).
PUBLIC FINANC E chs. 4-5 (1959).
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ture, which can hardly be regarded as radically progressive.6 The illusion is
no longer a secret!
Two of the articles presented here are devoted to problems related to tax
burden distributions especially with respect to progression. Professors Vickrey
and Smith criticize the existing taxes on income, though from different vantage points. Vickrey, on the one hand, analyzes the erosive impact of tax
loopholes and the failure of Congress to rectify its errors. He explores the
possibilities of a completely new progressive tax structure based upon expenditure and net worth taxes. Professor Smith presents a criticism of the
present income tax based upon his position concerning the inefficiencies and
inequities of steeply progressive rates. His arguments are clearly stated and
cogently developed and represent a point of view that is not too often stated
in the economists' literature these days. His position in favor of a maximum
marginal rate of fifty per cent is worth serious consideration.
The third basic taxing function of the modern state, and the one that is
the most recent addition is the Stabilization and Growth Function. This
policy area results from the cyclical fluctuations and secular sluggishness (or
exhilaration) that may occur in the performance of the economy. It is a
direct result of the revolution that took place in economic thinking with the
publication of John Maynard Keynes' The General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money in 1936. The fundamental argument in support of this
governmental activity may be stated succinctly. If a nation is to utilize its
resources optimally, it must experience stable economic growth uninterrupted by depressions, stagnation, or inflations. When contemporary economies
tend to exhibit such inefficiencies and inequities, deliberate policies for their
eradication are called for. To this end the instruments of monetary and
fiscal policy are useful. This function of government in a free society is a
much more recent one than the previous two mentioned; unlike those, it is
concerned with the performance of the economy as a whole (the size of the
pie) rather than with particular segments of it. The personal and national
economic disasters of the 19 3 0's demonstrated conclusively how impotent
laissez-faire economics could be in the face of a depression and indirectly
suggested how much waste and suffering could be avoided through deliberate
anti-depression policy. Similarly the threat of inflation, which was so evident
immediately following World War II and again in recent years, could only
be ameliorated by positive government action. Hence, while there is room
for debate over which particular monetary and fiscal instruments are most
desirable, there is hardly any question of the legitimacy of this stabilitygrowth function of government.
The role of tax policy in furthering the goals of stabilization and growth
is becoming widely recognized, even among politicians, as exemplified by the
tax cut of 1964 and the recent tax increase. Professor Poole, in his paper,
6. For a recent study of effective rates in the United States see Gillespie, Effect of
Public Expenditures on the Distribution of Income, in ESSAYS IN FISCAL FEDERALIS.% 122 (R.
Musgrave ed. 1965). Gillespie finds that in 1960 the effective federal rate structure was
moderately progressive ranging from 17.8% on family incomes below $2,000 to 30.6% on
incomes of S10,000 and over. Id. at 136.
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explores some of the frustrations and gratifications of using the various fiscal
instruments for this purpose. His analysis of the aggregate effects of fiscal
policy upon the capital markets complements the paper by Mr. Slowinski,
which is particularly welcome because of its timeliness. In an economically
interrelated world, domestic economic policy cannot be separated from foreign
policy, particularly if either policy effects the flow of capital. Poole and
Slowinski provide the reader with an abundance of clear thinking and information related to this topic. While the former concentrates upon the economics of tax policy with respect to saving and investment, the latter summarizes the changes in the law that bring about economic reactions, both
at home and abroad.
We turn now to the fourth and final major area in which taxes may be
considered significant instruments of policy. The preceding discussion summarized the fiscal functions that are a part of the duties of every modem
Western nation. However, in countries organized along federal lines, there
is an additional problem area that cries out for solution. In the unitary
state, the central authority possesses the power to conduct all fiscal functions
in whatever way it wishes. It may or may not choose to delegate some of its
responsibilities to the local level and can change these at any time. On the
other hand, in the federal nation, an intermediate level of government exists
between central and local authorities. This additional level, known as the
state government as in the United States and Australia or the provincial
government as in Canada, possesses certain fiscal responsibilities of its own,
which it derives from interpretation of the nation's constitution and not
simply from the central authority. In other words, in a federal union the
central government is sovereign in some fields with the member states sovereign in others, while the local governments have no inherent sovereignty
but merely perform those activities delegated by the states.
To preserve this system it is vital that the various levels be given the
jurisdiction over certain functional areas and the revenue necessary to carry
out their functions. It is a basic tenet of federalism that the several levels of
government must maintain a reasonable degree of independence. If this
is not adhered to, then the political structure becomes transformed into a
unitary-type state with all power at the center, or else a confederation where
the members are virtually sovereign while the central level is without any
authority. An example of the latter was the United States under the Articles
of Confederation. The national government was almost completely powerless
and without any independent sources of revenue, while the states behaved
as if there were no union whatsoever. For all intents and purposes, the American states were separate nations in 1786, even to the extent that some carried
out their own foreign relations. There is no better example of this particular
type of departure from the concept of federalism.
On the other hand, federalism can disintegrate when the member states
are left without any significant powers. Under Hitler, for example, the
various states in Germany were stripped of their political and financial authority to the extent that all power rested with the central government. In
effect, Germany became a unitary nation.
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In both of these examples, the importance of the fiscal aspects stands out.
If federalism is not to be undermined, then some balance must be struck
between the allocation of duties and revenues so that each level is capable of
carrying out its responsibilities.
In his paper, Professor Hellerstein presents and evaluates the various
alternative arrangements that are currently being proposed as possible solutions to the apparent fiscal dilemmas of many state governments. Included
in these proposals is the much celebrated Heller-Pechman plan for block
grants. Hellerstein's criticisms of this and other schemes and his defense of
more extensive conditional grant programs are important positions and welcome additions to the professional literature.
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